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NOTE 
The Quality of Mercy Is Not Strained: Interpreting the 
Notice Requirement of the Federal Tort Claims Act 
What need the bridge much broader than the flood? 
The fairest grant is the necessity. 
Look, what will serve is fit.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Ann McGuire 
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 {FfCA),2 the 
United States is liable for tort claims "in the same manner and to 
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances."3 
This limited waiver of sovereign immunity,4 subject to certain ex­
ceptions,5 grants federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over 
civil tort actions against the United States for money damages.6 
The Act requires a claimant suing the United States to file her 
claim first with the appropriate administrative agency.7 If the 
agency denies the claim, it mails a notice of final denial, and the 
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Much Ado About Nothing, in SHAKESPEARE: THE COM· 
PLETE WoRKS 697, 704 (G.B Harrison ed., Harcourt, Brace & World 1968). By the pricking 
of my thumbs, something Shakespeare this way comes. 
2. 28 u.s.c. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680 (1994). 
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2674; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 
4. See 35 AM. JuR. 2o Federal Torts Claims Act § 2 (Supp. 1998). 
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680. The exceptions vary widely. To cite some examples, the United 
States has not waived its sovereign immunity for claims arising from postal delivery, see 
§ 2680(b); tax collection, see § 2680(c); the activities of the Panama Canal Company, see 
§ 2680(m); wartime combatant activities of the military, see § 26800); abuse of process, libel, 
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights, see § 2680(h); or with 
some exceptions, for claims against law enforcement officers or arising from assault, battery, 
false imprisonment, false arrest, or malicious prosecution, see § 2680(h). 
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Plaintiffs may sue the United States for torts caused by the 
negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of a federal employee acting within the scope of her 
office or employment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 
7. The applicable section of the statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), provides: 
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money dam· 
ages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or 
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the 
scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the 
claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by 
the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to 
make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of 
the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of 
this section. 
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claimant then has six months to file the claim against the United 
States in federal court.8 Failure to file suit within six months from 
the date of mailing and within two years after the claim accrues9 
"forever bar[ s ]" the claimant from seeking relief in the courts under 
the FfCA.10 The Act does not specify to whom the agency must 
send the notice of denial. The Department of Justice (DOJ), 
charged by Congress with administering the Act,U therefore 
promulgated 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a), which requires that the agency 
send notice to the claimant, her attorney, or her legal 
representative.12 
The courts have applied this regulation to claims arising under 
the Act nearly uniformly, interpreting it to permit an agency to 
send notice to any of the recipients enumerated in the regulation. 
They generally have dismissed claimants' arguments that the notice 
of denial should have been sent only to them, or alternatively, to 
their attorneys, often with a succinct reference to the language of 
section 14.9.13 In late 1996, however, the Ninth Circuit let slip the 
dogs of war and held in Graham v. United States that section 14.9( a) 
requires that the notice of denial be sent only to the claimant's at-
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) provides: 
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in 
writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or 
unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or regis­
tered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented. 
See also 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). 
9. Despite the disjunctive in § 2401(b), which might lead the unwary to believe that a 
plaintiff need satisfy only one of the two conditions specified therein, the courts have held 
that a suit is time-barred unless it is filed within two years after it accrues and within six 
months of final denial by the agency. See, e.g., Houston v. United States Postal Serv., 823 
F.2d 896, 902 (5th Cir. 1987); Willis v. United States, 719 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1983); Schuler v. 
United States, 628 F.2d 199, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1980); infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text. 
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 240l(b). 
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1994) (directing agencies to adjust claims "in accordance with 
regulations prescribed by the Attorney General"). 
12. See 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) {1998) ("Fmal denial of an administrative claim shall be in 
writing and sent to the claimant, his attorney, or legal representative by certified or regis­
tered mail."). 
13. See, e.g., Hanson v. United States, 908 F.2d 257, 258 (8th Cir. 1990) (rejecting under 
the language of § 14.9 claimant's argument that the American Bar Association's Model Code 
of Professional Responsibility Rule 4.2, which prohibits an attorney from co=unicating 
directly with a represented party, mandates sending notice only to claimant's attorney); 
Hatchell v. United States, 776 F.2d 244, 245 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the notice of denial 
sent to claimant's attorney satisfied the requirements of § 14.9); Dyniewicz v. United States, 
742 F.2d 484, 485 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that sending the notice to claimant complied with 
§ 14.9); Childers v. United States, 442 F.2d 1299, 1302 (5th Cir. 1971) (citing § 14.9 to dismiss 
plaintiff's argument that mailing the notice to claimant is mandatory); Robinson v. United 
States, No. CIV.A.92-4869, 1993 WL 74841, at *7 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 1993) (finding that 
the Drug Enforcement Agency was "authorized by law," i.e., 28 C.F.R. § 14.9, to send the 
notice of final denial to the claimant and therefore did not breach its ethical duty not to 
communicate directly with represented parties). 
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torney, if the agency knows that the claimant is represented.14 The 
court justified its override of the language of the regulation primar­
ily on the grounds of "prevailing ethical standards. "15 Sending the 
notice to the claimant, the Ninth Circuit held, violates the ethical 
rule that attorneys may not communicate directly with parties they 
know to be represented.16 Because the Bureau of Prisons sent the 
notice of denial to Graham instead of to her attorney, the court 
permitted Graham's suit to proceed despite its late filing.17 
The Ninth Circuit's holding, while well-meaning, is perplexed in 
the extreme. This Note contends that courts should follow the 
traditional reading of section 14.9(a) and uphold the propriety of 
notice sent to either the claimant or her attorney. Courts seeking to 
grant relief to an unfortunate claimant should look to the principles 
of equity, not to a tortured reading of section 14.9. Part I argues 
that the traditional judicial interpretation of the Act's notice-of­
denial requirement, unlike the Ninth Circuit's reading, accords with 
the judicial deference properly given to administrative regulations, 
the plain language of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a), and the established 
14. See Graham v. United States, 96 F.3d 446, 449 (9th Cir. 1996). Katherine Graham, a 
federal prisoner, filed an administrative claim with the Department of Justice's Bureau of 
Prisons. Graham listed her attorney on the claim form and her attorney confirmed his repre­
sentation via mutual correspondence with the Bureau. When the Bureau eventually denied 
the claim, however, it sent the notice of denial directly to Graham, who, not realizing its 
importance, threw it away. The attorney, assuming that the agency had not acted on the 
claim, waited the six months specified in 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) and then filed suit in district 
court. In opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss the suit as untimely, Graham argued 
that the mailing of the notice to her did not trigger the statute of limitations because the 
Bureau should have sent the notice to her attorney. The district court held that although the 
Bureau had "inadvertently " mailed the notice to the claimant, the regulation authorized such 
action, and dismissed the suit. The Ninth Circuit reversed. See 96 F.3d at 447-48. 
15. See 96 F.3d at 449. 
16. See 96 F.3d at 449; MoDEL RuLES OF PROFESSJONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1996). In so 
holding, the court created a split among the federal courts of appeals on the specific issue of 
whether sending notice directly to the claimant constitutes an ethical violation. Compare 
Graham, 96 F.3d 446 with Hanson, 908 F.2d at 258 (rejecting an analysis very similar to that 
of the Graham majority and upholding the mailing of notice to a represented claimant). On 
the larger issue of this Note, whether an agency complies with 28 C.F.R. § 14.9 when it sends 
notice to a represented claimant, the Graham court essentially overruled an earlier Ninth 
Circuit opinion. Compare Graham, 96 F.3d at 449 (finding a violation of § 14.9) with 
Dyniewicz, 74 2 F.2d at 485 (finding compliance with § 14.9). The Graham court acknowl· 
edges only the split with Hanson. 
17. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 447-48. 
In the FI CA context, only one court besides Graham has allowed an untimely suit to go 
forward on the ground that notice should have been sent to the attorney instead of to the 
claimant See Mc Caffrey v. Nylon, Inc., No. CIV.A.95-3787, 1996 WL 1 2 2710, at * 2  (E.D. Pa. 
Mar. 13, 1996). In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, however, the McCaffrey court noted that 28 
C.F.R. § 14.9(a) does not ordinarily oblige the government to contact claimant's counsel. See 
McCaffrey, 1996 WL 1 2 2710, at * 2. Instead, the court gave relief to the plaintiff by equitably 
tolling the statute of limitations. See generally infra section III.C. A United States Bank­
ruptcy Court, on the other hand, found the Graham reasoning attractive and held that a 
bankruptcy notice sent to a represented claimant was inadequate. See In re Grand Union 
Co., 204 B.R. 864, 876-77 (Bankr. D. Del. 1997). 
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precepts of statutory construction. Part II demonstrates that send­
ing the notice of denial directly to the claimant has the Ninth Cir­
cuit's wrong rebuke and does not violate the ethical prohibition 
against communication with represented parties. Finally, Part III 
proposes an alternative method for ensuring that claimants are not 
unfairly deprived of their rights by outrageous fortune or unscrupu­
lous defendants. Courts should apply the well-established doctrine 
of equitable tolling when extraordinary circumstances warrant re­
lief, instead of being straight-jacketed in every case by a per se rule. 
I. HEEDING THE WORDS, WORDS, WORDS: THE JUSTIFICATIONS 
FOR A LITERAL READING 
The traditional reading of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a), which permits an 
agency to send notice to either the claimant, her attorney, or her 
legal representative,18 enjoys strong support from a number of 
sources. Section I.A demonstrates that the doctrines of judicial def­
erence to agencies' interpretations of statutes and their own regula­
tions dictate that courts should regard as authoritative both the 
DOJ's regulation and its reading of that regulation. Section I.B 
then contends that the plain language of the regulation, interpreted 
in accordance with the canons of construction, justifies a traditional 
reading by the DOJ or other agency. Section I.B also argues that 
the drafters of the regulation intended to give agencies discretion in 
choosing the recipient of the denial notice, and that courts should 
give effect to that intent because the usual justification for overrid­
ing regulatory text - clear frustration of drafters' intent - is not 
applicable here. 
A. To Thine Own Agencies Be True: The Commitment to 
Judicial Deference 
The principles of judicial deference to administrative agencies' 
interpretations of statutes and of their own regulations demand that 
courts respect the traditional interpretation of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a). 
Given broad discretion by the FTCA to interpret the statute,19 the 
DOJ decreed that notice may be sent either to the claimant or to 
her representative. Part I.A.1 first asserts that because section 
14.9(a) is a reasonable and permissible construction of the Act's 
notice provisions, a court may not fashion, wrest, and bow its own 
reading of the statute to require that agencies send notice only to 
18. For the sake of succinctness, this Note does not make separaty arguments regarding a 
claimant's legal representative. Instead, this Note can adequately address the role of a legal 
representative with its arguments regarding attorneys. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 448 (calling 
Graham's attorney her "legal representative"). 
19. See 28 U. S.C. § 267 2 (1994) (providing that agencies adjust claims "in accordance 
with regulations prescribed by the Attorney General"). 
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attorneys. Part I.A.2 then argues that because the judiciary also 
owes deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations, 
a court should ratify the DOJ's construction of section 14.9(a), 
which permits notice to be sent to either a claimant or her attorney. 
This Part concludes that these doctrines of judicial deference re­
quire that courts direct policy concerns to the political branches of 
the government. Because neither the DOJ nor Congress has found 
section 14.9(a) and its traditional interpretation to be so rank and 
gross in nature as to require changing, courts should accede to the 
language of the regulation and its implementation by agencies and 
allow agencies to send notice to the claimant. 
1. Chevron Deference 
Under the principles of judicial deference to agencies' interpre­
tations of statutes, a court should defer to the regulation promul­
gated by the DOJ, which allows agencies to choose the recipient of 
the notice of denial. The Supreme Court has held, most notably in 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,20 that 
when a court reviews an administrative agency's interpretation of a 
statutory provision the agency is charged with administering, the 
court must accept the agency's "reasonable" or "permissible" con­
struction, if the statute is silent or ambiguous on the issue in ques­
tion. 21 The interpretation offered by the agency, moreover, need 
not be the only permissible interpretation or even one the court 
itself would have reached.22 "If the agency regulation is not in con­
flict with the plain language of the statute," the Supreme Court 
makes clear, "a reviewing court must give deference to the agency's 
20. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Earlier Supreme Court cases also expounded the principles of 
deference to agency interpretations of statutes. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 
(1965). 
21. See Chevron, 461 U.S. at 842-44; see also KMart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 
291-92 (1988). The Court in Chevron made clear that if Congress "explicitly left a gap for the 
agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific 
provision of the statute by regulation." 467 U.S. at 843-44. If, on the other hand, Congress 
directly addressed the issue and its intent is clear, the court must reject any construction that 
is contrary to the clear congressional intent. See 467 U.S. at 842-43, 843 n.9. 
Later cases discussed what sort of ambiguity courts require in the statute in order to 
proceed to the determination of whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable or permis­
sible and therefore entitled to deference. A minority of courts maintain that any ambiguity 
whatsoever is enough for a court to proceed to the reasonableness/permissibility determina­
tion. See, e.g., Tataranowicz v. Sullivan, 959 F.2d 268, 276-77 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding ambi­
guity in a statutory caption sufficient). The majority view, however, requires that the 
ambiguity be substantial. A court must first apply the traditional tools of statutory construc­
tion; only if the court cannot thereby discern congressional intent does it analyze the agency's 
interpretation. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-48 (1987). 
22. See Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 981 (1986); Chevron, 467 U.S. 
at 843 n.11; Reed v. Reno, 146 F.3d 392, 395 (6th Cir. 1998). 
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interpretation of the statute."23 In short, the judiciary may not sup­
plant an agency's judgment with its own.24 
In enacting and amending the Federal Tort Claims Act, Con­
gress essentially delegated the choice to the DOJ by remaining si­
lent on the issue of the proper recipient of the denial notice.25 The 
Attorney General, in promulgating 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a), construed 
the FTCA's notice requirement to allow notice to be sent to either 
the claimant or her attorney. To merit the great deference ac­
corded administrative regulations, section 14.9(a) need only be rea­
sonable, a measure the regulation easily meets. Though 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2401(b) mentions neither the claimant nor the claimant's attor­
ney, section 2675 speaks in terms of the claimant. A suit is barred, 
that section provides, unless "the claimant shall have first presented 
the claim to the appropriate Federal agency."26 When the only 
party named in the FTCA notice provisions is the claimant, al­
lowing the notice of denial to be sent to the claimant is not "arbi­
trary, capricious, or manifestly contrary"27 to the statute.28 
Because section 14.9(a) is a reasonable interpretation of the 
Act's notice provisions, that regulation should be the be-all and 
end-all of a court's analysis of permissible notice recipients. A 
court cannot issue a blanket order that notice be sent only to coun­
sel of record.29 Such a rule, in addition to playing fast and loose 
with the plain language of the regulation, would not give proper 
deference to the DOJ's interpretation. A court should not disturb a 
reasonable choice made by an agency unless the statute or its legis­
lative history shows that Congress would not have approved of the 
23. KMart Corp., 486 U.S. at 292; see also Chevron, 461 U.S. at 844 (holding that courts 
must uphold administrative regulations unless they are "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute"). 
24. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983); Associated FISheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104, 109 (1st Cir. 1997). 
25. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2675(a) (1994); Chevron, 461 U.S. at 843-44. The legislative 
history is similarly silent. See S. REP. No. 89-1327 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2515; H.R. REP. No. 89-1532 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515 . 
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (emphasis added). 
27. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
28. One might argue, of course, that the drafters of § 2675 merely used the term "claim­
ant" as shorthand for "claimant, or, if the claimant is represented, her attorney." Under 
Chevron, however, a proponent of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) need only demonstrate that interpret­
ing the statutory "claimant" to refer to the actual claimant is not manifestly contrary to the 
statute. Chevron does not allow a reviewing court to decide that the drafters actually meant 
something different, unless the drafters' intent is unmistakable. See Young v. Co=unity 
Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 981 (1986); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; Reed v. Reno, 146 F.3d 
392, 395 (6th Cir. 1998). 
29. Cf. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985) ("[T)he fact that Congress might 
have acted with greater clarity or foresight does not give courts a carte blanche to redraft 
statutes . . . . 'There is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress' silence and 
rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted.'" (quoting Mobil Oil 
Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978))). 
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agency's interpretation.30 Nothing in the Act, its amendments, or 
its legislative history demonstrates congressional rejection of the 
DOJ's interpretation of the notice requirement. Because the Ninth 
Circuit "may not substitute its own construction of a statutory pro­
vision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of 
an agency,"31 the Graham court should have confirmed the lan­
guage of section 14.9. 
2. Bowles Deference 
The Ninth Circuit is further curtailed to the fair proportion of 
the traditional reading by a second prescript of judicial deference. 
In addition to giving deference to the regulation promulgated by 
the DOJ, a court should also give deference to the DOJ's interpre­
tation of its own regulation and allow the DOJ and its constituent 
subdivisions to choose from among the recipients the Attorney 
General listed in section 14.9(a). The Supreme Court held in 
Bowles v. Seminole Rock and Sand Company32 and subsequent 
cases33 that when the meaning of an administrative construction it­
self is in doubt, an agency's interpretation of its own regulation is 
controlling unless that interpretation is "plainly erroneous or incon­
sistent with the regulation. "34 As with Chevron deference, an 
agency's approach need not be the only one it could have permissi­
bly adopted, nor even one the court itself would have chosen.35 
The Bureau of Prisons (the Bureau), a subordinate arm of the 
Justice Department,36 has interpreted section 14.9(a) in conformity 
30. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845. 
31. 467 U.S. at 844. 
32. 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
33. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994); Martin v. Occu­
pational Safety and Health Review Commn., 499 U.S. 144 (1991); Robertson v. Methow Val· 
ley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 354-59 (1989); see also, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 
F.3d 1324, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Kester v. Campbell, 652 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1981). 
34. Bowles, 325 U.S. at 414. This kind of deference, the Court noted, is "even more 
clearly in order" than deference to agency interpretations of statutes. See Udall v. Tallman 
380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); see also Mausolf v. Babbitt, 125 F.3d 661, 667 (8th Cir. 1997); Southern 
Pac. Transp. Co. v. Public Serv. Commn., 909 F.2d 352, 356 (9th Cir. 1990). The Court ex­
plained that while congressional intent or constitutional principles may sometimes be rele­
vant in choosing a construction, the "ultimate criterion" is the administrative interpretation. 
See Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512; Bowles, 325 U.S. at 414. 
35. A court need only find that the agency's construction is sufficiently reasonable and 
consistent with the wording of the regulation and the statute under which the regulation was 
promulgated. See Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 702 (1991); Young v. Com­
munity Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 981 (1986); see also General Elec. Co., 53 F.3d at 1327 
(noting that courts may defer even "where the agency's reading of the statute would not be 
obvious to the most astute reader" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
36. The Department of Justice consists of four principal organizational units: offices, di­
visions, bureaus, and boards. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.1 (1998). The Bureau of Prisons, like the 
other DOJ subdivisions, remains under the control of the DOJ. For example, the Attorney 
General resolves any jurisdictional disagreements between the Bureau and the other subdivi­
sions. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.195 (1998). The Attorney General also controls both the Director of 
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with that regulation's plain language: the Bureau sends notice 
either to claimants or to attomeys.37 While the Bureau may have a 
"practice" of sending notice to counsel,38 doing so is not an obliga­
tion. Because the DOJ's interpretation of section 14.9(a) via the 
Bureau39 is consistent with the regulation, a court complying with 
the Bowles doctrine should defer to the DOJ's construction and al­
low notice to be sent to either a claimant or her attorney.40 
Obliged to acknowledge the pertinence of at least the Chevron 
doctrine,41 the Graham court charges once more unto the breach 
and declares that the Bureau did not follow its own interpretation 
of the regulation in question. The Ninth Circuit claims that the Bu-
the Bureau and the discharge of the Bureau's duties. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4041, 4042 (1994); 28 
C.F.R. § 0.96, 0.96( d) (1998). The Director of the Bureau may redelegate the authority given 
to him by the Attorney General only to employees of the Department of Justice. See 28 
C.F.R. § 0.97 (1998). 
Given the dominion of the DOJ over the Bureau of Prison's affairs, the Graham majority 
is correct to consider the Bureau of Prisons and the DOJ to be the same agency. See Graham 
v. United States, 96 F.3d 446, 449 (9th Cir. 1996) (calling the DOJ "the defendant in this 
action"); see also Reynolds v. Wise, 375 F. Supp. 145, 148 (N.D. Tex. 1974) ("[T)he Bureau of 
Prisons . . .  functions as a part of the Department of Justice . . . .  "); cf. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 
Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation, 117 S. Ct 796, 807 (1997) (holding that 
when Congress has divided the adjudicative and enforcement/litigation duties of a single 
agency into "two sub-'agencies,' . . .  it is the overarching agency that is the 'agency"' for 
purposes of naming a respondent). 
37. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 450 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("Contrary to what the opinion 
claims, the agency has never interpreted the regulation as requiring that notice be sent to 
counsel if the claimant is represented."). Compare Hatchell v. United States, 776 F.2d 244, 
245 (9th Cir. 1985) (reporting that the Bureau of Prisons sent notice of denial to claimant's 
attorney) with Graham, 96 F.3d at 447 (reporting that the Bureau of Prisons sent notice of 
denial to claimant) and Hanson v. United States, 908 F.2d 257, 258 (8th Cir. 1990) (per 
curiam) (same). Other agencies have proved likewise variable in their "practice" under the 
FTCA. Compare, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 748 F.2d 291, 292 (5th Cir. 1984) (reporting 
that the Veterans Administration (VA) sent notice to claimant) with Berti v. V.A. Hosp., 860 
F.2d 338, 339 (9th Cir. 1988) (reporting that the VA sent notice to claimant's eounsel). 
38. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 450 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
39. See supra note 36. Even if a court considered the Bureau to be a separate agency 
from the DOJ, however, the traditional construction of§ 14.9(a) would still prevail. If the 
Bureau of Prisons were a different agency than the DOJ, the Bureau's interpretation of the 
FTCA's notice provisions or of § 14.9(a) would not merit deference; under Chevron, the 
proper inquiry would be solely regarding the DOJ's interpretation. See American Rivers, 
Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commn., 129 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1997); California Natl. 
Guard v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 697 F.2d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 1983). And under Chev­
ron, the result is clear: courts (and other administrative agencies) must accede to the DOJ's 
interpretation of the statutory notice provisions, i.e.,§ 14.9(a), which allows notice to be sent 
to a represented claimant. See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text. 
40. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). In fact, a court 
might have rendered the Bureau infirm of purpose if the agency had interpreted§ 14.9(a) as 
the Ninth Circuit has. Construing§ 14.9(a) to direct notice to be sent only to known counsel 
is inconsistent with that regulation, given § 14.9(a)'s "or" language. See infra section I.B 
(discussing the regulation's plain language and arguing that courts must give effect to that 
language). Courts will invalidate an agency interpretation inconsistent with the wording of 
the regulation. See United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872-73 (1977). 
41. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 449. 
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reau's correspondence with Graham's counsel42 showed that the 
Bureau intended to deal solely with the attorney, and that the Bu­
reau therefore follows the Graham majority's interpretation of sec­
tion 14.9(a).43 This mumpsimus ascends the highest heaven of 
invention, but does not hold up under the applicable case law or the 
facts. By sending notice alternatively to claimants and to counsel,44 
the Bureau has demonstrated that the DOJ interprets section 
14.9(a) to allow for a choice of notice recipients. Under Bowles, a 
court should defer to that interpretation.45 The "or" in section 
14.9(a) and the Bureau's application of that disjunctive denote a 
foregone conclusion: the Ninth Circuit should have adhered to the 
principles of judicial deference and upheld the sending of the notice 
to Graham. 
The FTCA gives the DOJ license to issue regulations interpret­
ing the Act. Policy arguments regarding those regulations "should 
be addressed to legislators or administrators, not to judges."46 28 
C.F.R. § 14.9(a) and the DOJ's interpretation of it are reason­
able47-and thereby hangs a tale. Had the DOJ or Congress agreed 
with the Ninth Circuit's perception of the impropriety of sending 
notice directly to a represented claimant, either one could have 
changed the policy at some time during the twenty years since the 
regulation was enacted.48 Instead, they acquiesced in the findings 
of the courts that heeded the regulation's "or."49 Under the princi­
ples of judicial deference articulated by the Supreme Court and the 
Ninth Circuit itself, absent exceptional circumstances50 courts 
should approve the discretion the statute and regulation give to ad­
ministrative agencies. 
42. See supra note 14. 
43. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 449-50. Giving deference to the Bureau's blunder of sending 
the notice to the claimant, the majority declares, would be improperly applying the Chevron 
doctrine to the "rubber-stamping (of] an after-the-fact rationalization of a mistake." 96 F.3d 
at 450. 
44. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
45. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text. 
46. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 864 (1984); 
see also Stedman v. Pederson, 875 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1989). 
47. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. 
48. See Diamond Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commn., 528 
F.2d 645, 648-49 (5th Cir. 1976) ("If the regulation missed its mark, the fault lies in the word­
ing of the regulation - a matter easily remedied under the flexible regulation promulgating 
structure . . .. "). 
49. See supra note 13. 
50. See infra Part III. 
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B. Speaking Plain and to the Purpose: Language, Construction, 
and the Department of Justice's Intent 
A court may find the traditional reading of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9 un­
reasonable under Bowles only if it clearly thwarts the plain lan­
guage of the regulation or the intent of the regulation's drafter, the 
DOJ.51 Yet the unambiguous language of the regulation52 requires 
that courts approve whatever recipient the agency chooses, be it the 
claimant or her attorney. This section argues that the traditional 
reading of section 14.9(a), which allows notice of denial to be sent 
to either the claimant or her attorney, frustrates neither the regula­
tion's plain meaning nor the purposes of the regulation and the stat­
utory notice provisions it effects. This section makes clear, 
furthermore, that the evidence of the DOJ's intent in drafting sec­
tion 14.9(a) supports the traditional interpretation of the regulation. 
The text of a regulation or statute is the accepted starting point 
for interpretation.53 With exquisite reason, courts have agreed that 
the purpose and meaning of statutes and regulations are best indi­
cated by the "ordinary meaning" of the words used.54 The judici­
ary, furthermore, is loath to assume that the drafters' work product 
is merely full of sound and fury, signifying nothing: the courts have 
a duty to give effect, if possible, to every word and phrase used in a 
regulation.55 In short, the plain meaning controls.56 
The text of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) is clear.57 The regulation pro­
vides: "Final denial of an administrative claim shall be in writing 
and sent to the claimant, his attorney, or legal representative by 
certified or registered mail."58 In common usage, the word "or" 
51. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994). 
52. The regulation provides: "Fmal denial of an administrative claim shall be in writing 
and sent to the claimant, his attorney, or legal representative by certified or registered mail." 
28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) (1998). 
53. See, e.g., Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990); Pennsylvania Dept. of 
Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557-58 (1990); Citizens Action League v. Kizer, 887 
F.2d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1989). Courts apply the same principles of construction to regula­
tions as they do to statutes. See, e.g., Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205, 222 n.20 
(1981); Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435, 439 (1935). 
54. See Moskal, 498 U.S. at 108. See also, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 
44, 57 n.9 (1996); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 385 n.2 (1992); United States 
v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95-96 (1985); United States v. 594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 871 F.2d 824, 
825-26 (9th Cir. 1989). 
55. See United States Dept. of the Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 504 n.6 (1993); United 
States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992). 
56. See United States Natl. Bank of Or. v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 
U.S. 439, 453-54 (1993); Connecticut Natl. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992); Strick­
land v. Commissioner, Me. Dept. of Human Serv., 48 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1995). 
57. A disagreement between courts as to the interpretation of a statute or regulation does 
not make the statute or regulation ambiguous for purposes of plain-language analysis. See 
Jones v. Brown, 41 F.3d 634, 639 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
58. 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) (emphasis added). 
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indicates a choice among all of the concepts which surround it.59 
Rather than following the Ninth Circuit's attempt to fright the 
words out of their right sense and ignore part of the text, courts 
should presume the usual disjunctive usage of "or" and allow an 
agency sending a notice of denial to choose between the claimant 
and her attorney.60 
Giving effect to section 14.9(a)'s text does not obstruct the 
DOJ's intent in promulgating the regulation or the aim of the 
FTCA's notice provisions. A court may ignore the plain language 
of a regulation only when straightforward application of the text 
would lead to absurd results, ones that clearly frustrate the drafters' 
intent. 61 In Willis v. United States, 62 for example, the Second Cir­
cuit held that Congress intended the "or" in section 2401(b) of the 
FTCA 63 to mean "and. "64 Otherwise, a claimant who filed a claim 
with the administrative agency within two years of the claim's ac­
crual could thereafter bring a claim in a district court at any time in 
the future, no matter how heavy the interim. 65 The specter of such 
an absurd result,66 the court found, justified the performance of 
"surgery upon [the] statutory text[] . . thereby giving effect to 
what Congress meant as distinguished from what it said."67 Other 
59. See WEBSTER'S TmRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1585 (1986) ("conj. 1 -
used as a function word to indicate (1) an alternative between different or unlike things, 
states, or actions; ( 2) choice between alternative things, states or courses."); THE AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 873 ( 2d college ed. 1985) ("a. An alternative, usually only before 
the last term of a series."); BoB DOROUGH, Conjunction Junction, on SCHOOLHOUSE RocK: 
GRAMMAR RocK (American Broadcasting Music, Inc. 1973). 
60. See Graham v. United States, 96 F.3d 446, 450 (9th Cir. 1996) (Kozinski, J., dissent­
ing); see also supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
61. See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 27 2, 284 (1987); Commis­
sioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965); Trustees of Ind. Univ. v. United States, 618 F.2d 
736, 739 ( Ct. Cl. 1980); Chicago Transit Auth. v. Adams, 607 F.2d 1 284, 1 289-90 (7th Cir. 
1979). Alternatively, in exceptional cases where straightforward application of regulatory 
text leads to a particularly unfair expiration of the limitations period, courts may utilize the 
doctrine of equitable tolling. See infra Part III. 
6 2. 719 F.2d 608 ( 2d Cir. 1983). 
63. See supra note 8. 
64. Other courts holding§ 2401(b)'s "or " to mean "and " include the 5th Circuit in Hous­
ton v. United States Postal Serv., 8 23 F.2d 896, 90 2 (5th Cir. 1987), and the D.C. Circuit in 
Schuler v. United States, 6 28 F.2d 199, 201 ( D.C. Cir. 1980). 
65. See Willis v. United States, 719 F.2d 608, 610 ( 2d Cir. 1983). 
66. Such a result would deprive a potential defendant of the repose that statutes of limita­
tions are meant to provide. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); English v. 
Pabst Brewing Co., 8 28 F.2d 1047, 1049 (4th Cir. 1987). The evidence in a case, furthermore, 
would be left but a very prey to time: the eventual factfinder would have to piece out the 
imperfections of unavailable or forgetful witnesses and lost evidence. See Kubrick, 444 U.S. 
at 1�7; Mortensen v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 23, 27 ( S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
67. Willis, 719 F.2d at 610. The court points to the legislative history of§ 2401 to illumi­
nate Congress's intent that the "or" mean "and." In the Senate report, for example, the 
congressional committee stated that "a claimant must file a claim in writing ... within 2 years 
after the claim accrues, and [is] further require[d to file] a court action within 6 months of 
notice by certified or registered mail of a final decision . . . .  " S. REP. No. 89-13 27, Analysis 
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courts, similarly wishing to avoid results thatiplainly contradict leg­
islative purpose, have also refused to be bound by the whips and 
scorns of a strict grammatical construction.68 
In contrast to these cases, however, the traditional reading of 28 
C.F.R. § 14.9(a) is consistent with the intent of the regulation's 
drafter. The purpose of section 14.9(a) is to explicate the FTCA's 
notice provisions,69 which say only that an agency must send the 
notice of denial by certified or registered mail.70 Section 14.9(a) 
clarifies these provisions by specifying to whom the notice may be 
sent, and the traditional interpretation of the regulation simply con­
forms to the words of the regulation. Any fears that the traditional 
interpretation of section 14.9(a) produces "absurd or futile"71 re­
sults, therefore, are shallow, without instance.72 
The Ninth Circuit, however, focuses not on the purpose of the 
regulation but rather on the purpose of the statutory notice provi­
sions. Reasoning that the object of the notice provisions is to "en­
sure that notice is given in a manner that effectively triggers the 
time for filing a court action,"73 the court claims that allowing an 
agency to send notice directly to a represented claimant thwarts 
that purpose.74 The court focuses on an attorney's responsibility for 
preparing and filing the suit,75 implying that the running of the limi-
§ 7 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2522; see also Willis, 719 F.2d at 612. The 
Senate report adds that the proposed amendments to the FICA "will have the effect of 
reducing the number of pending claims which may become stale and long delayed because of 
the extended time required for their consideration,.'' S. REP. No. 89-1327, Statement. After 
judicial recognition of such clearly expressed intent, Congress likely felt it unnecessary to 
change the wording of the Act's notice provisions. The history of§ 14.9(a), on the other 
hand, evidences no such clear intent contrary to the regulation's plain meaning. Though 
§ 14.9(a) is a regulation, unlike § 2401, the same principles of construction apply to both 
regulations and statutes. See supra note 53. 
68. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
69. See Graham v. United States, 96 F.3d 446, 448 (9th Cir. 1996) ("In implementing the 
statute, the Department of Justice has attempted to prescribe the notice requirement more 
fully . . • .  "). 
70. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2675(a) (1994). 
71. J.C. Penney Co. v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1962). 
72. As Part II demonstrates, sending notice to a represented claimant pursuant to § 14.9 
does not violate the ethical rule against communicating with represented parties, because the 
ethical rule itself contains an exception for commurucations authorized by law. Allowing a 
court to overturn as "absurd" (i.e., as an ethical violation) this or any other law authorizing 
contact with a represented claimant would render that exception meaningless. See infra Part 
rr 
I 
73. Graham, 96 F.3d at 448. In support of its claim, the majority adduces the Senate and 
House reports on the 1966 amendments to the FICA. See 96 F.3d at 448. Neither report, 
however, discusses the notice provisions. The Senate report, for example, merely reiterates 
that the claimant must file suit within six months of notice by certified or registered mail of 
the agency's final decision. See S. REP. No. 89-1327, Analysis § 7 (1966), reprinted in 1966 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2522. 
74. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 448. 
75. See 96 F.3d at 448. 
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tations period should depend upon the agency's mailing the denial 
notice to the person who will pursue the claim. But this supposition 
greets the statute with sharp defiance: section 2401(b) specifically 
states that the statute of limitations is triggered on the date the no­
tice is mailed.76 Neither notice provision deems relevant the date of 
receipt or the recipient's role in proceeding with the claim; they 
simply dictate that the claimant has six months from the date of 
mailing to file suit. Neither receipt by nor actual notice to the 
claimant is required.77 An agency effectively commences the six­
month limitations period by sending the notice directly to a repre­
sented claimant. 
Even assuming arguendo that satisfactory triggering of the stat­
ute of limitations requires receipt and comprehension by the person 
who will prepare the claim, the Ninth Circuit's per se rule would 
not advance that end enough to justify its bloody constraint on the 
plain language of section 14.9(a). The Graham majority's interpre­
tation benefits only those claimants with attorneys; its translation of 
section 14.9(a) cannot make an unrepresented claimant more noble 
in reason and better able to understand the notice she receives. 
The Ninth Circuit's reading, furthermore, will matter only in those 
cases where a represented claimant fails to timely forward the no­
tice to her attorney. Only then would the traditional reading puzzle 
the putative will of the FTCA's notice provisions; this hardly consti­
tutes the "plain variance" or "absurd result" necessary to ignore the 
text of the regulation.78 And for myriad reasons, an attorney could 
untimely file a claimant's suit even if the agency sends the notice of 
denial directly to the attorney.79 The Graham attorney-only pre-
76. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1994) ("unless action is begun within six months after the 
date of mailing"). Other statutes, in contrast, provide that receipt of the notice triggers the 
statute of limitations. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1994) (providing that a complaint 
against the government for a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act must be filed 
within 90 days of the claimant's receipt of notice of final action taken by the EEOC). 
77. See Berti v. V.A. Hosp., 860 F.2d 338, 340 (9th Cir. 1988); Carr v. Veterans Admin., 
522 F.2d 1355, 1357 (5th Cir. 1975); Pascarella v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 790, 792 (D. 
Conn. 1984). 
The two-year statute of limitations in§ 2401(b) is equally strict. A claim accrues once a 
plaintiff discovers the existence and cause of her injury, for example, even if she is unaware 
that her injury was negligently inflicted or that she has legal rights. See United States v. 
Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 123 {1979); Golden v. U.S. Marshals Serv., No. C 95-3417, 1995 WL 
705134, at *3 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 1995). 
78. In those cases where the attorney did not receive notice because the administrative 
agency did not act fairly (where the agency deliberately declined to send the notice to an 
attorney with whom it had been previously communicating, for example), a court could equi· 
tably toll the statute of limitations. See infra Part III. 
79. In Pascarella v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 790 (D. Conn. 1984), for example, the 
General Services Administration sent its final denial of the plaintiff's claim to her attorney at 
his firm. No one at the firm ever brought the notice to the attention of the plaintiff's counsel, 
so both he and the plaintiff remained unaware of the denial until after the statute of limita· 
tions had run. The court, unsympathetic to their plight, issued summary judgment for the 
defendant. See 582 F. Supp. at 792. Potential mishaps need not be as complicated as that. 
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cept is a tool too rudely stamped to achieve the statute's supposed 
aim. 
An examination of other regulations drafted by the subdivisions 
of the DOJ, furthermore, demonstrates the DOJ's purposefulness 
in designating both a represented claimant and her attorney as au­
thorized recipients. In other regulations but not in section 14.9(a), 
the Attorney General allowed limitations on the parties to whom 
agencies may send notice. By doing so, the DOJ evinced its most 
profound earnest that agencies be free to choose the recipient of 
the notice of denial. The regulations of the DOJ's Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS),80 for example, direct that the INS 
send notice only to the attorney or representative of record if the 
person is represented.81 By passing on this attorney-only notice 
provision in the INS regulations, the DOJ has exhibited its ability to 
limit the entities to whom notice may be sent.82 That the Attorney 
General chose to employ the differing language of section 14.9(a) 
with respect to FTCA claims confirms its intent to allow notice 
under the FI'CA to be sent also to a represented claimant.83 If it 
An attorney could simply misplace the notice of denial, for instance, or miscalculate the date 
on which the limitations period expires. 
80. The INS, like the other DOJ subdivisions, i:emains under the control of the DOJ. The 
Attorney General bears the ultimate responsibility of administering and enforcing the immi­
gration laws, controls all employees and records of the INS, and is charged with promulgating 
the immigration regulations. See 8 U.S.C. § l103(a) (1994). The Attorney General may dele­
gate his responsibilities and authority to the Commissioner of the INS, see 8 U.S.C. § 1103(b ), 
but doing so does not divest the Attorney General of any of his powers, privileges, or duties. 
See 8 C.F.R. § 2.1 (1994). 
81. 8 C.F.R. § 292.S(a) (1994) provides: "Whenever a person is required by any of the 
provisions of this chapter to give or be given notice[,] . . .  such notice .. . shall be given by or 
to ... the attorney or representative of record, or the person himself if unrepresented." 
82. This differentiation regarding notice also appears in other contexts. The bankruptcy 
rules, for example, contain several contrasting rules of service. Rule 3007 states that an ob­
jection to a claim must be delivered to the claimant; Rule 7004(h) requires that service on 
insured depository institutions be made to their counsel; and Rule 7004(b)(9) requires that a 
debtor and its attorney be served simultaneously if the debtor is represented. See In re Lo­
mas Fmancial Corp., 212 B.R. 46, 52-53 (Bankr. D. Del. 1997). Section 405 of the Social 
Security Act (SSA), which deals with the procedure for payment of social security benefits, 
provides that notice of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security will be mailed 
to the individual. See 42 U.S.C. § 405; 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(c) (1994). If an individual for­
mally appoints a representative, however, the Social Security Administration will send the 
notice to the representative. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1707; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1715 (1994). In either 
case, the Fifth Circuit has held that the statute of limitations on judicial review under the SSA 
begins running when the individual receives notice, not when the attorney receives it. See 
Flores v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 1991). 
83. Cf. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 (1994) ("[I]t is generally pre­
sumed that [a drafter] acts intentionally and purposely when it includes particular language in 
one section of a statute but omits it in another."); Tafoya v. United States Dept. of Justice, 
Law Enforcement Assistance Admin., 748 F.2d 1389, 1391-92 (10th Cir. 1984) ("We presume 
that . . .  clear use of different terminology within a body of legislation is evidence of an 
intentional differentiation."). 
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had had no such intent, the DOJ would have used language like 
that of the INS regulation. 84 
The DOJ intended, as clear as is the summer sun, to authorize 
agencies to send notice to the claimant or her attorney. Except in 
extraordinary conditions that justify an exception to the traditional 
reading,85 courts should yield to that intent. 
II. MucH Ano ABouT NoTHING: THE ETHICS OF SENDING 
NOTI CE TO A REPRESENTED CLAIMANT 
The traditional construction of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) does not vio­
late the ethical rule against attorneys communicating with parties 
they know to be represented by legal counsel. 86 Because the rule 
itself allows for direct contact with represented parties where au­
thorized by law, sending the notice of denial to a represented claim­
ant does not contravene the rule. 
The Graham majority issues its per se rule largely in response to 
the ethical violation it misreads into an agency's communicating di­
rectly with a represented claimant. The court, in refusing to dismiss 
Graham's suit as untimely,87 calls upon the long-standing ethical 
rule that prohibits attorneys from communicating with persons they 
know to be represented about the subject matter of the representa­
tion. This rule, the Ninth Circuit explains, is designed to prevent a 
lawyer from improperly taking advantage of a lay person's lack of 
84. The language of the INS regulation also counters any claim that the DOJ included the 
words "the claimant " in 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) only to account for claimants not represented by 
an attorney. The INS Commissioner, and therefore the DOJ, see supra note 80, encompasses 
unrepresented claimants much more definitely in the INS regulation by providing that notice 
be sent to "the person himself if unrepresented. " 8 C.F.R. § 29 2.5. Had the DOJ intended 
for notice to be sent only to a represented claimant's attorney, furthermore, it could have 
accomplished that result without naming "the claimant " at all. A regulation naming the 
claimant's attorney as the only proper recipient of the _denial notice would allow for the 
notice to be sent to the claimant if she had no attorney. 
85. See infra Part III. 
86. The general embodiment of this proscription is Rule 4. 2 of the American Bar Associ-
ation (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides: 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the repre­
sentation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the 
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to 
do so. 
MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4. 2 (1995). The Model Rules of Profes­
sional Conduct were adopted in 1983, replacing the ABA Model Code of Professional Re­
sponsibility, which itself superseded the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics. DR 7-104(A)(1) 
of the Model Code was substantially identical to the original Model Rule 4. 2. See ABA 
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 396 (1995); ANNOTATED 
MoDEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4. 2, Model Code Comparison (1983). 
All 50 states and the District of Columbia have rules to protect represented persons from 
contact by opposing counsel. See Graham v. United States, 96 F.3d 446, 449 (9th Cir. 1996). 
See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Op. 396 (1995) 
(examining the history of the prohibition, beginning with Hoffman's 1836 treatise). 
87. For the facts of the case, see supra note 14. 
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legal knowledge and training.ss So while the majority's rewriting of 
the regulation is madness, there is commendable method in it; the 
court wishes to prevent agencies from causing claimants like 
Graham to lose their claims through their own incompetence.s9 
The majority accordingly concludes that the direct contact with a 
represented claimant permitted by 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) violates the 
anti-contact ethical norm.9o 
The milk of human kindness, however, cannot overcome the ex­
press license granted by the ethical rule itself for an administrative 
agency to send the notice of denial to a claimant. The rule specifi­
cally allows communication with a represented party if such contact 
is "authorized by law."91 Communications authorized by law, the 
drafters of the model rule elucidated, include those that are "specif­
ically authorized by statute, court rule, court order, statutorily au­
thorized regulation or judicial decisional precedent."92 Even the 
Ninth Circuit admits that "express legal authorization overrides 
ethical rules. "93 Because the FTCA directs the Attorney General 
to promulgate regulations to implement the Act,94 sending notice to 
a represented claimant under the auspices of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9( a) fits 
into the "authorized by law" exception to Model Rule 4.2, its pred­
ecessors, and its state-law progeny.95 
A proponent of the Ninth Circuit's standpoint might attempt to 
fright the soul of this fearful adversary by arguing that the general 
authority the FTCA gives to the DOJ to promulgate regulations 
does not specifically authorize the DOJ to issue regulations that 
contravene ethical rules, and that such regulations are therefore 
"not authorized by law." Even assuming arguendo that section 
14.9(a) does violate the anti-contact rule, however, the DOJ did not 
88. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 449; see also Hill v. St. Louis Univ., 123 F.3d 1114, 1121 {8th 
Cir. 1997); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Op. 396 {1995); 
ANNOTATED MODEL RuLES, supra note 86, Legal Background. 
89. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 448. 
90. See 96 F.3d at 449. 
91. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1995). Every jurisdiction but 
Florida expressly makes this exception to its anti-contact rule. See ABA Comm. on Ethics 
and Professional Responsibility Formal Op. 396 {1995). But see also Florida Bar Assn. 
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 89-6 {1990) (maintaining that even Florida's rule "must 
be construed to allow compliance with statutes requiring notice or service of process directly 
on the adverse party"). For the sake of clarity, this Note will use the language of Model Rule 
4.2 and the ABA opinions regarding Rule 4.2. 
92. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Op. 396 {1995) (em-
phasis added). 
93. Graham, 96 F.3d at 449. 
94. See 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1994). 
95. If issued pursuant to statutory authority, substantive agency regulations implementing 
federal statutes have the "force and effect of law." See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 
281, 295-96 (1979 (internal quotation marks omitted)); Public Utilities Commn. v. United 
States, 355 U.S. 534, 542 (1958). 
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need specific congressional authorization to promulgate such a reg­
ulation. The Supreme Court has held that state law is nullified to 
the extent that it conflicts with a federal regulation.96 The Court 
added that "[a] pre-emptive regulation's force does not depend on 
express congressional authorization to displace state law; moreover, 
whether the administrator failed to exercise an option to promul­
gate regulations which did not disturb state law is not dispositive."97 
The general grant of authority the Act gives to the DOJ, therefore, 
is sufficient to support the DOJ's issuance of 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a), 
regardless of whether that regulation contradicts the no-contact 
rule.9s An agency sending notice to a represented claimant in ac­
cordance with section 14.9(a) confines itself within the modest lim­
its of ethics, because doing so is authorized by law. 
Refusing to be cornered by the authorized-by-law exception, 
however, the Graham majority screws its courage to the sticking 
place and asserts that the real issue is whether 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) 
should even be interpreted to authorize agency contact with a rep­
resented claimant. The court notes that the defendant "govern­
ment offers no guidance as to why such a blanket authorization is 
necessary, or even useful, in this context"99 and chides the Eighth 
Circuit for not explaining why the regulation should be read to au­
thorize such contact when it upheld the mailing of notice to a repre­
sented claimant in Hanson v. United States.100 The regulation 
96. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); Flor­
ida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963). 
97. Fidelity Fed., 458 U.S. at 154; see also Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 308; United States v. 
Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381-83 (1961). 
98. Nevertheless, the judiciary has expressed some concern over an agency being allowed 
to misuse the "authorized by law" exception to exempt its attorneys from adherence to the 
rules of ethics. The single regulation called into question on these grounds is 28 C.F.R. § 77, 
in which the DOJ authorizes government attorneys to communicate directly with a number 
of represented parties, including represented defendants being investigated for "additional, 
different, or ongoing crimes or civil violations" and employees of a represented organization 
who are not "controlling individual[s]." See 28 C.F.R. §§ 77.6(e), 77.lO(c) (1994). At least 
one court has held that this regulation is "not authorized by law," on the grounds that general 
statutes do not give sufficient authority for the DOJ to excuse its attorneys from state ethical 
requirements. See United States ex rel. O'Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 961 F. Supp. 
1288, 1294 (E.D. Mo. 1997); cf. United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993) (reaching 
the same holding regarding the "Thornburgh Memorandum," a DOJ policy statement that 
was the precursor to 28 C.F.R. § 77). O'Keefe, however, overlooks the Supreme Court prece­
dent holding that a regulation prevails over conflicting state law. See, e.g., Fidelity Fed., 458 
U.S. at 153-54; Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 142-43. In addition, the 
administrative role of an attorney merely sending notice of denial to a claimant does not raise 
the same ethical dilemmas as an attorney performing the investigative and adversarial func­
tions contemplated in § 77. 
99. Graham v. United States, 96 F.3d 441, 449 (9th Cir. 1996). 
100. See 96 F.3d at 449; Hanson v. United States, 908 F.2d 257 (8th Cir. 1990). Hanson is 
the only other appellate decision to date on the ethical violation issue. In Hanson, the Bu­
reau of Prisons sent its notice of denial by certified letter to the claimant, who subsequently 
did not file his medical malpractice suit against the government until nearly three months 
after the limitations period had expired. In his appeal from the dismissal of his claim, the 
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should therefore be interpreted, the court concludes, not as "an ex­
ception to prevailing ethical norms . . . [but rather] in accordance 
with those norms."101 
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning, however, overlooks the fact that 
in all American jurisdictions but one,102 the exception is the norm. 
Because section 14.9(a) gives express permission to contact a repre­
sented party, the lawyer who does so is almost universally in com­
pliance with the ethical rule. Neither the government nor the 
judiciary need Gudgel their brains to justify the necessity or useful­
ness of authorizing the exception to the ethical rule. The DOJ had 
the authority to draft this regulation, and the regulation says an 
agency may send notice to the claimant. The Ninth Circuit should 
respect that administrative decision, rather than calling for the DOJ 
or another court to justify the regulation.103 
An agency deciding where to send notice, therefore, need not 
think too precisely on the event. Regardless of whether the sending 
of the notice of denial to a represented claimant is intentional104 or 
erroneous, the agency that does so violates no ethical rule against 
co:t;nmunicating with represented parties.10s 
claimant argued that sending the notice to him instead of to his attorney of record violated 
DR 7-104(a)(l) of the ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and therefore ren­
dered the notice ineffective. Tue Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that since 28 
C.F.R. § 14.9(a) authorized the Bureau to send the notice to the claimant, no ethical violation 
occurred. See Hanson, 908 F.2d at 258. 
Tue Graham dissent hurls down its indignation at the majority's censure of its fellow 
appellate court: "No doubt the Eighth Circuit didn't offer such an explanation," the dissent 
retorts, "because it saw no plausible way to wring the majority's meaning from the regula­
tion's sparse language." Graham, 96 F.3d at 450 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
101. Graham, 96 F.3d at 449. 
102. See supra note 91. 
103. Concluding that 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) is not authorized by law, furthermore, would 
have dire effects on the administrative state. As the dissent points out, scores of federal 
regulations "authorize - perhaps even require - that notice be sent to the claimant person­
ally[,]" to the claimant and her attorney, or in language substantially identical to that of 28 
C.F.R. § 14.9(a), to the claimant or her attorney. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 452 nn.3, 5 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (listing 31 regulations requiring notice to be sent to the claimant, 7 
regulations requiring notice to be sent to the claimant and her attorney, and 22 regulations 
requiring notice to be sent to the claimant or her attorney). Tue Graham per se rule would 
invalidate all of the regulations in the second and third groups, and possibly those in the first 
as well, a result that Congress could not have intended. 
104. If the claimant can demonstrate that the agency deliberately sent the notice to her 
instead of to her known counsel with the intent of causing her to miss the six-month deadline, 
a court could exercise its equitable discretion, toll the statute of limitations, and allow her suit 
to proceed. See infra Part III. 
105. See Hanson, 908 F.2d at 258; Robinson v. United States, Nos. CIV. 92-4869, CIV. 92-
6175, 1993 WL 74841, at *7 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 1993) ("[T]he DEA was 'authorized by 
law' [i.e., 28 C.F.R. § 14.9] to send the final denial to the claimant."); cf. Weinstein v. Rosen­
bloom, 322 N.E.2d 20, 24-25 (Ill. 1974) (holding that notice requesting a continuance sent by 
an attorney directly to the adverse party, in accordance with the applicable regulation of the 
Illinois Industrial Commission, was "pursuant to law" and therefore did not violate Canon 7, 
EC 7-18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility). 
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III. THE BEITER PART OF VALOR IS DISCR E TI ON: THE 
EQUITABLE TOLLING ALTERNATIVE 
Even though sending notice to a represented claimant is author­
ized by 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) and therefore does not in and of itself 
violate ethical norms, occasionally a court should refuse to counte­
nance such an action and allow a suit otherwise precluded by the 
statute of limitations to proceed. This Part describes some of those 
situations and contends that even in those cases, the Graham ma­
jority's per se rule prohibiting agencies from sending notice to rep­
resented claimants is not necessary to do good service to claimants. 
The per se rule, moreover, is overbroad: any represented claimant 
who received notice would benefit from the rule, regardless of the 
circumstances surrounding the running of the statute of limitations 
in that case. 
Instead, in extreme cases courts should apply the well­
established principles of equitable tolling to permit suit when dis­
missal would be unjust. The doctrine of equitable tolling allows a 
court to suspend the statute of limitations temporarily on grounds 
of fairness to the plaintiff, usually having to do with some secret 
mischief the defendant sets abroach.106 Application of this doctrine 
strikes the proper balance between serving the interests of justice 
and heeding the will of Congress in enacting the FTCA's statute of 
limitations. Courts may refuse to ratify an agency's sending of no­
tice to a represented claimant, but if it were done, when 'tis done, 
then 'twere well it were done equitably. 
Section III.A first describes the judicial acceptance of equitable 
tolling in the FTCA context. Acknowledging the need for some 
flexibility in applying statutes of limitations to bar actions under the 
Act, section ill.A maintains that the doctrine of equitable tolling 
serves that need with more matter and less art than the Ninth Cir­
cuit's per se rule. Section III.B then presents the rules for equitable 
tolling under the Act, which rein in trial judges' discretion and en-
106. See infra section III.B. Many cou rts distinguish between two kinds of equitable ex ­
ceptions to the limitations period : equitable tolling and equitable estoppel . When a plaintiff 
is unaware of her cause of action , these courts say , equitable tolling is the proper course . A 
cou rt may toll the limitations pe riod , for example , when "the defendant has wrongfully 
decei ved or misled the plainti ff in order to conceal the existence of a cause of action ." Eng ­
lish v. Pabst Brewing Co. , 828 F.2d 10 47 , 10 49 ( 4th Cir . 1987) ; see also Kelley v. NLRB , 79 
F.3d 1238 , 12 47- 48 ( 1st Cir. 1996) ; Goodhand v. United States , 40 F.3d 209 , 2 13 (7th Cir . 
199 4). Equitable estoppel , on the other hand, applies when the plainti ff knows about the 
cause of action. A cou rt will toll the statute of limitations on the basis of equitable estoppel 
when the de fendant 's intentional misconduct causes the plaint iff to miss the fil ing deadl ine . 
See Kelley, 79 F.3d at 12 47 ;  Goodhand, 40 F .3d at 2 13 ;  English, 828 F.2d at 10 49. 
The Supreme Court in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 ( 1990) , how ­
e ver , noted in dictum that equitable estoppel should be treated as a form of equitable toll ing . 
See 498 U.S. at 96. In any e vent , the courts agree that equitable exceptions in a suit against 
the go ve rnment , whate ver they are called , should be sparingly applied . See infra notes 130 -32 
and accompany ing text. 
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sure that equitable tolling is applied only in exceptional cases. Sec­
tion III.B also offers some applications of those standards · to 
illustrate how the doctrine remains faithful to section 14.9(a) in 
most cases but allows a departure from the text where justified. Fi­
nally, section III.C demonstrates that by applying the doctrine of 
equitable tolling, a district court gave fit disposition to a suit 
brought under the Act. 
A. Both Rhyme and Reason: The Need for Equitable Tolling in 
Claims under the FTCA 
The doctrine of equitable tolling addresses the concerns of both 
fair play and circumspection. This doctrine allows courts to over­
look the expiration of the limitations period, but only in cases 
where the facts and justice warrant such a result. 
The Ninth Circuit, though it created a per se rule that does not 
comport with applicable law, followed the time-honored tradition 
of trying to protect unwitting plaintiffs. Cases where an agency 
sends the notice of denial to a claimant in a deliberate attempt to 
delay her filing of a lawsuit, for example, would justifiably catch the 
conscience of a court. A claimant might also deserve relief in cases 
where the claimant and her attorney strive mightily to preserve 
their legal rights but miss the limitations period because the notice 
was sent to the claimant and lost.107 As the Sixth Circuit notes, the 
claimant often is not to blame when the course of judicial redress 
does not run smooth: 
[B]y setting short time limitation periods and establishing a maze of 
regulatory appeals, the government virtually assures that any but the 
most astute [claimant] will find his or her claim barred by some proce­
dural technicality once he or she gets to the United States District 
Court. We . . .  believe these plaintiffs should be able to pursue their 
individual claims.108 
The Ninth Circuit advances this notion not wisely but too well. 
Courts do need to have a measure of flexibility in deciding whether 
or not to apply statutes of limitations in order to "further the inter­
ests of justice."109 If a defendant sent the notice of denial to a 
claimant in a deliberate attempt to hinder her suit, for example, 
fairness to the plaintiff would warrant withholding enforcement of 
the statute of limitations. 
But courts should not allow the exception to swallow the rule. 
The Ninth Circuit's per se rule against sending notice to repre-
107. See, e.g., McCaffrey v. Nylon, Inc., No. CIV.A.95-3787, 1996 WL 122710, at *1 (E.D. 
Pa. Mar. 13, 1996). 
108. Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 152 (6th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
109. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1549 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
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sented claimants encompasses all such claimants, regardless of the 
wherefores of their untimely filing. A claimant who let the limita­
tions period expire out of sheer forgetfulness or even apathy, for 
example, would still benefit from the rule. That the Ninth Circuit 
spurns the clear language of section 14.9(a) to secure such an over­
broad result is the most unkindest cut of all. By substituting the 
doctrine of equitable tolling, on the other hand, a court can deter­
mine on a case-by-case basis whether the sending of notice to a rep­
resented claimant justifies a departure from the license of 28 C.F.R. 
§ 14.9(a).110 The principles of equitable tolling, unlike the Ninth 
Circuit's per se rule, give courts the ability to permit technically 
time-barred suits only when doing so would serve the interests of 
justice. 
Because of this selectivity, courts would be more comfortable 
with the equitable tolling alternative. The courts, far from agreeing 
that the gentler gamester is the soonest winner, are generally strict 
in requiring compliance with statutes of limitations: 
Procedural requirements . . .  for gaining access to the federal courts 
are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for par­
ticular litigants . . . .  "[I]n the long run, experience teaches us that strict 
adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature 
is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the Iaw."111 
A court that believes that as a matter of course it must be cruel only 
to be kind would likely reject a per se rule that disregards the stat­
ute of limitations in every case where a represented claimant re­
ceived notice. Even a more lenient court would probably take 
exception to a rule that allows undeserving claimants to profit. If 
courts instead followed the guidelines of equitable tolling already 
laid out by the judiciary, they could allow an untimely suit to pro­
ceed only when the facts of the case warrant such a result. 
B. The Happy Few: The Protocol of Equitable Tolling under 
the Act 
The courts have with right and conscience recognized the need 
for equitable tolling in actions under the FTCA. Dealing estab­
lished precedent a very palpable hit, the Supreme Court held in 
Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs112 that statutes of limita­
tions in suits against the government, like those in actions against 
private defendants, may be equitably tolled.113 The majority of 
110. See, e.g., McCaffrey, 1996 WL 122710. 
111. Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984) (quoting Mohasco 
Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980)); see also McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 
(1993). 
112. 498 U.S. 89 (1990). 
113. See 498 U.S. at 95-96. Before lnvin, courts had uniformly held that the statutory 
time limits in the FfCA were jurisdictional in nature and therefore could not be waived, 
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courts have since interpreted Irwin to mean that statutory time lim­
its in most suits against the government,114 including actions under 
the FTCA,115 are not jurisdictional prerequisites and are therefore 
subject to waiver, equitable tolling, and estoppel.116 
A court wishing to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling can go 
about its business straight, because the judiciary has already clearly 
specified when a court should utilize equitable tolling in an FTCA 
case. In Irwin, the Supreme Court limited equitable tolling to cases 
where "the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by 
filing a defective pleading during the statutory period, or where the 
complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary's miscon­
duct into allowing the filing deadline to pass."117 The circuit courts, 
agreeing that equitable tolling is an "exceptional doctrine" gener­
ally available only to vigilant or deceived parties,118 have clarified 
Irwin by specifying factors that weigh in favor of equitable tolling. 
These factors include the plaintiff's reasonable lack of knowledge, 
actual or constructive, of the filing requirements; her reasonable­
ness in remaining unaware of the proper filing procedures; her dili­
gence in pursuing her legal rights; and the absence of prejudice to 
the defendant if the case is allowed to proceed.119 
tolled, or estopped. See, e.g., Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957); Gould v. 
U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Serv., 905 F.2d 738, 741 (4th Cir. 1990); Burns v. United 
States, 764 F.2d 722, 724 (9th Cir. 1985). 
114. Although lnvin dealt with a Title VII employment discrimination action, the Court's 
holding has since been applied to a plethora of other types of suits against the United States. 
See, e.g., Fadem v. United States, 52 F.3d 202 (9th Cir. 1995) (Quiet Title Act); Anderson v. 
Unisys Corp., 47 F.3d 302 (8th Cir. 1995) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Wilson 
v. United States, 23 F.3d 559 (1st Cir. 1994) (Public Vessels Act and Suits in Admiralty Act); 
Nunnally v. MacCausland, 996 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1993) (Civil Service Reform Act); Catawba 
Indian Tribe v. United States, 982 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Tucker Act); Goldbach v. Sulli­
van, 779 F. Supp. 9 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (Equal Access to Judgment Act). But see Webb v. 
United States, 66 F.3d 691 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that the presumption of equitable tolling 
does not apply in tax refund cases). 
115. The first circuit court to apply lnvin to the FTCA was the Eighth Circuit, in Schmidt 
v. United States, 933 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1991). The court found that "necessary to [Invin's] 
expressed holding is an implied holding that strict compliance with the statute of limitations 
is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suing the government." 933 F.2d at 640. Other circuit 
courts have since concurred. See, e.g., Goodhand v. United States, 40 F.3d 209, 213-14 (7th 
Cir. 1994); Glamer v. Department of Veterans Admin., 30 F.3d 697, 701 (6th Cir. 1994); 
Pipkin v. United States Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 272, 275 (10th Cir. 1991). In several cases, 
however, the Fifth Circuit has disregarded lnvin and held that the FTCA time limits remain 
jurisdictional and unwaivable. See Flory v. United States, 138 F.3d 157, 159 (5th Cir. 1998); 
Price v. United States, 69 F.3d 46, 54 (5th Cir. 1995). 
116. See Schmidt, 933 F.2d at 640; Glamer, 30 F.3d at 701; Goodhand, 40 F.3d at 213-14; 
cf. Warren v. Department of the Interior Bureau of Land Management, 724 F.2d 776, 778 
(9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the regulations promulgated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2672, i.e. 28 
C.F.R. §§ 14.1-14.11, are not jurisdictional prerequisites). 
117. lnvin, 498 U.S. at 96; see also Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 
151 (1984). 
118. See Wilson v. United States, 23 F.3d 559, 561-62 (1st Cir. 1994). 
119. See, e.g., Kelley v. NLRB, 79 F.3d 1238, 1248 (1st Cir. 1996); Glamer v. Department 
of Veterans Admin., 30 F.3d 697, 702 (6th Cir. 1994). 
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In short, the courts recognize that the patient must minister to 
herself. They will not extend equitable tolling to cases involving 
inexcusable or "garden variety" neglect,120 where the claimant 
"failed to exercise due diligence in preserving [her] legal rights."121 
For instance, a plaintiff would probably not receive the benefits of 
equitable tolling if she just forgot to give the notice to the earnest 
advocate she hired to plead for her. Similarly, the courts would 
almost certainly refuse to forgive a missed deadline if the claimant 
gave the notice to her attorney but the attorney simply did not file 
in time. The result of a case like Graham, where the claimant acci­
dentally throws the notice away,122 is more difficult to predict. Gra­
ham's failure to exercise due diligence - to examine her mail at 
least cursorily and refrain from discarding letters from the agency 
with which she filed a claim - might prevent her from reaping the 
benefits of equitable tolling.123 On the other hand, a court applying 
the principles of equitable tolling might examine Graham's educa­
tional and personal background, as well as her probable expectation 
that all notices would be sent to her attorney, and determine that 
her throwing away the notice did not sink to the level of "garden 
variety" neglect.124 So long as the claimant exercised the diligence 
120. Black's Law Dictionary defines "excusable neglect" as 
a failure to take the proper steps at the proper time, not in consequence of the party's 
own carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard of the process of the court, but in con­
sequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident, or reliance on the 
care and vigilance of his counsel or on promises made by the adverse party. 
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 566 (6th ed. 1990). It adds that at least for purposes of a motion 
to vacate judgment, excusable neglect is "that neglect which might have been the act of a 
reasonably prudent person under the circumstances." Id.; see also United States v. York 
Elec. Constr. Co., 25 F.R.D. 478, 479 (D. N.D. 1960). 
121. lnvin, 498 U.S. at 96; see also Baldwin County Welcome Ctr., 466 U.S. at 151; John­
son v. United States Postal Serv., 64 F.3d 233, 238 (6th Cir. 1995); Arigo v. United States, 980 
F.2d 1159, 1162 (8th Cir. 1992). 
122. See Graham v. United States, 96 F.3d 446, 447 {9th Cir. 1996). 
123. See lnvin, 498 U.S. at 96 ("We have generally been much less forgiving in receiving 
late filings where the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights."); 
Baldwin County Welcome Ctr., 466 U.S. at 151 ("One who fails to act diligently cannot in­
voke equitable principles to excuse that lack of diligence."). 
The Ninth Circuit's description of the facts does not suggest that Graham failed to see the 
notice of denial. The majority indicates that the claimant "did not realize the import of the 
denial," which implies that Graham read or at least saw the letter. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 
447. In a more generous reading of the facts, Graham might have assumed that the notice 
she received was simply a copy of a notice sent to her attorney. A "reasonably prudent 
person under [those] circumstances," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 566 (6th ed. 1990), how­
ever, would have confirmed with her attorney sometime in the months after she received the 
notice that the attorney had indeed received a copy, or at least questioned whether the attor­
ney had everything she needed to file suit. Cf Pratt v. McCarthy, 850 F.2d 590, 592 (9th Cir. 
1988) ("The mistake [of counsel] cannot be characterized as unique or extraordinary . . . .  No 
one checked to ensure that a notice of appeal was filed when the deadline approached. To 
find excusable neglect on these facts would run roughshod over our existing precedent."). 
124. Cf Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 392 
(1993) ("Although inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do 
not usually constitute 'excusable' neglect, it is clear that 'excusable neglect' under (FRCP] 
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due in her particular situation, the courts may consider equitable 
tolling as an alternative to dismissal for untimely filing. 
Applying this due-diligence criterion, the courts have indicated 
that they will toll the limitations period when the plaintiff reason­
ably relied on deceptive or obstructionist conduct of the defend­
ant125 and for other circumstances where the claimant's failure to 
meet the filing deadline was beyond her control.126 Given the 
Ninth Circuit's focus on an agency's knowledge that the claimant is 
represented,127 a court applying the doctrine to a FfCA suit might 
also require the attorney to have taken measures to inform the 
agency of her representation, and the agency to have acknowledged 
that representation. The courts might toll a limitations period, for 
instance, if an agency intentionally mails the notice to the claimant 
in the hope that the letter would never be forwarded to the known 
attorney, and its plan succeeds.128 This justification for equitable 
tolling would not extricate Graham from her plight, unfortunately, 
because the Graham majority found that the Bureau's mailing of 
the notice to Graham was inadvertent.129 As a more mundane ex­
ample, equitable tolling might also be well thought upon in a case 
where an agency accidentally sends notice to the claimant, but due 
to some clerical error by the agency the claimant's attorney is un­
able to confirm, despite her best efforts, that the notice was sent at 
all. 
The courts should not think meet to put a forgiving disposition 
on for every represented claimant who files untimely after directly 
receiving a notice of denial. Because "[t]he certainty and repose 
[that statutes of limitations] confer would be lost if their application 
is up for grabs in every case,"130 courts should utilize equitable toll­
ing carefully and only in limited circumstances.131 In the context of 
suits against the government, some courts apply the doctrine of eq-
Rule 6(b) is a somewhat 'elastic concept' and is not limited strictly to omissions caused by 
circumstances beyond the control of the movant."). 
125. See Kelley v. NLRB, 79 F.3d 1238, 1247-48 (1st Cir. 1996); Goodhand v. United 
States, 40 F.3d 209, 213 (7th Cir. 1994); Niccolai v. United States Bureau of Prisons, Director, 
4 F.3d 691, 693 (8th Cir. 1993). 
126. See Baldwin County Welcome Ctr., 466 U.S. at 151; Kelley, 79 F.3d at 1248 ("out of 
[the plaintiff's] hands"); Niccolai, 4 F.3d at 693; Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 
1550 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("extraordinary events which are beyond plaintiffs' control"). 
127. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 448. 
128. Of course, the significant evidentiary issue of the defendant's intent would have to 
be resolved by the court. 
129. See Graham, 96 F.3d at 448. 
130. English v. Pabst Brewing Co., 828 F.2d 1047, 1049 (4th Cir. 1987). 
131. See Kelley, 79 F.3d at 1247; Pipkin v. United States Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 272, 275 
(10th Cir. 1991); Pratt v. McCarthy, 850 F.2d 590, 592 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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uitable tolling even more sparingly.132 Unless the facts surrounding 
the mailing of the notice of denial satisfy the requirements for the 
application of equitable tolling, the court should follow the tradi­
tional interpretation of section 14.9(a) and uphold the agency's 
mailing to the claimant. 
By applying these principles to the facts of a particular FfCA 
action, a court can ease the winter of a deserving plaintiff's discon­
tent without creating a glorious summer for everyone else. Absent 
an extraordinary state of affairs, the court would remain faithful to 
the language of and intent behind 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a), as well as to 
the doctrines of judicial deference to agency interpretations of stat­
utes and their own regulations. Because courts would apply equita­
ble tolling only in exceptional situations, the regulation's "or" 
would still have meaning in the vast majority of cases. 
C. Thus Hath the Course of Justice Whirled About: The Sound 
Application of Equitable Tolling in McCaffrey v. Nylon 
The even-handed justice of equitable tolling has already been 
applied successfully to the notice provisions of the Act and 28 
C.F.R. § 14.9(a). In 1996, a U.S. district court considered an issue 
and facts similar to those of Graham.133 The National Park Service 
had been communicating with the claimants' attorney, but then 
broke its promise to notify the attorney of its final decision on their 
administrative claim.134 The evidence also showed that the claim­
ants never received the notice sent directly to them by the 
agency.135 While acknowledging that the agency had discharged its 
obligation under the Act when it mailed the notice to the claimant, 
the court applied the doctrine of equitable tolling and allowed the 
plaintiffs to proceed despite the late filing of their suit.136 
The court justifiably held that the facts warranted the equitable 
tolling of the statute of limitations. The plaintiffs were both diligent 
and misled;137 they were not to blame for their failure to file \vithin 
the statutory time limits.138 Citing Irwin and finding that this was 
132. See, e.g., Kelley, 79 F3d at 1248 ("It is axiomatic that '[t]he grounds for tolling stat­
utes of limitations are more limited in suits against the government.'" (quoting Swietlik v. 
United States, 779 F.2d 1306, 1311 (7th Cir. 1985))). 
133. See McCaffrey v. Nylon, Inc., No. CIV.A.95-3787, 1996 WL 122710, at *1·2 (E.D. Pa. 
Mar. 13, 1996). 
134. See McCaffrey, 1996 WL 122710, at *2. 
135. See McCaffrey, 1996 WL 122710, at *2. 
136. See McCaffrey, 1996 WL 122710, at *1-2. 
137. See Wtlson v. United States, 23 F.3d 559, 561-62 (1st Cir. 1994) (declining to apply 
equitable tolling in a case where the plaintiff had failed to exercise due diligence and was not 
misled by the government defendant). 
138. Compare McCaffrey, 1996 WL 122710, at *1-2 with Yillah v. United States, No. 
CIV.A.98-2842, 1998 WL 661545 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 1998), in which the court found an 
FTCA plaintiff undeserving of equitable relief. In response to a motion to dismiss for un-
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"not a case in which a litigant 'failed to exercise due diligence in 
preserving his legal rights,' " the court denied defendants' motion to 
dismiss the untimely suit.139 Significantly, the court noted that sec­
tion 14.9(a) does not oblige the government to send notice to claim­
ant's counsel.140 Such a holding would have been mercy, but too 
much security: all represented claimants to whom the agency sent 
notice would then have been entitled to a tolling of the limitations 
period, regardless of the reason for their failure to file timely or 
their own fault therein.141 By using the doctrine of equitable tolling 
instead of subsuming all claimants under a "one-size-fits-all" rule, 
the district court bent justice to its awe without breaking it all to 
pieces. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts should follow the traditional, literal reading of 28 C.F.R. 
§ 14.9(a), which allows an agency to send the FTCA notice of de­
nial to either a claimant or her attorney, even if the claimant is rep­
resented. Unlike the Ninth Circuit's per se rule requiring that 
agencies send notice only to the attorney, the traditional reading 
grows in a fair consent with the doctrine of judicial deference to 
agencies' interpretations of statutes and their own regulations, the 
plain language of section 14.9(a), the established precepts of statu­
tory construction and the intent of the regulation's drafters. An 
agency choosing to send notice to a represented claimant does not 
violate the ethical rule against direct contact with represented per­
sons, because the communication is authorized by law, the regula­
tion itself. 
In exceptional situations that justify a departure from the text of 
section 14.9(a) - where the claimant's suit is filed late because the 
agency sent the denial notice to the claimant even though justice 
and fairness, given the facts, would clearly require the agency to 
send notice to the attorney - the court may equitably toll the 
FTCA's statute of limitations to allow an otherwise-untimely suit to 
proceed. The equitable tolling approach departs from the tradi-
timely filing, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant agency's use of permissive ("suit may be 
filed") rather than mandatory language in its notice of denial inadequately notified his coun­
sel of the limitations period, thereby entitling the plaintiff to equitable relief. See 1998 WL 
661545, at *3. Tue court found this argument "implausible," noting that "[e]ven a cursory 
reading of the relevant statutory provisions should have alerted counsel to inquire [with the 
agency] as to the actual status of the claim and whether Mr. Ytllah's statutory rights were 
being affected." 1998 WL 661545, at *3. Refusing to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling, 
the court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 1998 WL 661545, at 
*3-4. 
139. See McCaffrey, 1996 WL 122710, at *2 (quoting Irwin v. Department of Veterans 
Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)). 
140. See McCaffrey, 1996 WL 122710, at *2. 
141. See supra sections III.A and 111.B. 
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tional reading of section 14.9(a) only in the most extraordinary and 
specific of circumstances. A court utilizing this doctrine, therefore, 
remains faithful for the most part to the precepts of judicial defer­
ence, the text of the regulation, the rules of statutory construction, 
and the drafters' intent. One district court has already successfully 
used equitable tolling in the FTCA context, correctly giving relief 
to a deserving plaintiff while at the same time avoiding the over­
breadth of a per se rule. 
The ability to achieve an equitable result in a specific case while 
considering only the facts of that case is a consummation devoutly 
to be wished. Such a solution accords section 14.9(a) itself and ap­
plicable case law, and serves the interests of claimants without un­
duly restricting the courts. Therefore let every court now task its 
thought, that this fair action may on foot be brought.142 
142. Selections from SHAKESPEARE: T HE  C OMPLETE W orucs appear throughout this 
Note. Under these circumstances, bluebooking is a custom more honored in the breach than 
in the observance. 
